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The paper develops a general equilibrium model with incomplete markets where the asset
structure is endogenized. This asset structure allows to consider a new class of objective
functions of prot maximizing rms. This class of objective functions is independent of
the utilities of the stock holders. Corporate equilibrium properties are studied for this
model. It is shown that the organization of production is generally ecient. This result is a
consequence of the generalization of the separation theorem of the Arrow-Debreu model to
incomplete markets. Finally, the paper shows that corporate equilibria are not independent
of the rms nancial activities.
1 Introduction
Most of the literature about general equilibrium models with incomplete markets derives
equilibrium properties independently of the asset structures. For a sample of the huge lit-
erature on exogenous asset formation models see Diamond [1967], Dr eze [1974], Grossman
and Hart [1979], Geanokopolos [1990], Magill and Quinzii [2002], and others. In these
models, xed production sets are stretched over two periods. A natural interpretation of
prots maximization is for the producer to choose inputs of production in period one such
that period two outputs maximize prots. It is well known that in this economic scenario,
rms need be assigned a rule in order to obtain a closed form equilibrium solution. This
extra information is derived from the utilities of the owners of the rm, i.e. Dr eze [1974]
or Grossman and Hart [1979] criteria. Thus, it follows that rms maximize exogenously
assigned average utilities. This has non-trivial economic implications. Assigning utilities
to the rms comes at cost of abandoning the decentralization property of the Arrow-
Debreu model. Another drawback of this class of exogenous asset formation models is
the independency of the production sets from the nancial activities of the rms. As a
consequence of this asset structure, where the nancing of production essentially plays no
role, nancial policies are indeterminate. For a sample of this literature see Stiglitz [1969],
Stiglitz [1974], DeMarzo [1988], Magill and Quinzii [2002], and Due and Shafer [1986a].
Finally, assigning utilities to the objective function of the rm introduces a further source
of ineciency (Geanokopolos et al. [1990]). Hence, welfare distortions.
By means of a leading example, the aim of this paper is to improve on the theory
of the rm in incomplete markets where the economic scenario is reduced to exogenous
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1asset structures. Thus, we add more structure to the economic model by considering the
role intermediate goods and nancial assets play in the theory of the rm in incomplete
markets. This enables us to endogenize the production capacity available to the rm.
The paper considers an economic scenario where rms issue stocks in period one, buy
intermediate goods, and build up their production capacity. Total capital a rm can
purchase is bounded by the cash it can acquire through the stock market. In period
two, the rm has a well dened production set in each state of nature. Its short run
activity is then to choose inputs of production such that prots are maximized. Short run
production inputs are nanced with the revenue obtained from selling goods in period two.
Long run production factors are nanced through the stock market in the rst period,
and determine the rm's size.
This economic scenario is suciently interesting to derive objective functions of the
rms which are independent of the utilities of the stock holders. For this class of models
we show that the activities of the consumers are independent of the activities of the
producers. This generalizes the decentralization property of the Arrow-Debreu model to
incomplete markets. This result improves on the models introduced by Dr eze [1974], and
Grossman and Hart [1979] where the objective function of the rm is not independent of
the utility of the owners of the rm. Another property of our model is that rms maximize
prots in the long run. This implies that in the long run, rms chose prot maximizing
nance quantities, and purchase capital in order to build up their production set. In the
short run, they chose prot maximizing inputs of production at competitive prices, and
given installed production capacity. This economic interpretation of the activities of the
rm is not possible in models with exogenous asset structure. The immediate consequence
of this structure is that the organization of productive activities of the rm is ecient.
This follows from the independence of the sequential objective function of the rm from
the utilities of the stock holders. Finally, we show that, since the level of production
capacity of the rm is not independent of the activities of the rm on nancial markets,
nancial policies have real equilibrium eects. This result is a consequence of the more
realistic asset structure considered.
Section two introduces the development of the model and its results. Section three is
a conclusion. All proofs are in the appendix.
2 The Economic Model
This paper considers a variation of the model of the rm introduced in Stiefenhofer [2009]
and Stiefenhofer [2010] for the case that nancial activities are explicitly modeled. This
requires the introduction of an extensive form model of the rm. We consider a simple
model with sucient structure to highlight the main properties of interest. Let the budget
constraints of the single agent as a consumer be
p(0)  x(0) = p(0)  !(0)   qz
p(s)  x(s) = p(s)  !(1) + R( y;s)z:
A consumption bundle x = (x(0);x(s)) is a collection of vectors dened on the strictly
positive orthant R
l(S+1)
++ with associated strictly positive price system p = (p(0);p(s)) in
R
l(S+1)
++ . A nancial quantity z (number of stocks) is a strictly positive real number R++
with associated price system q in R++. We denote the initial resources of this economy
! = (!(0);!(1)) in R2l
++. Note that there is no aggregate uncertainty in this economy,
instead we consider rm specic risk. An uncertain state of nature is an element denoted
2s in the exhaustive set of mutually exclusive elements S. R( y;s)z denotes the return of
investment into the rm. The consumer invests into the rm in order to transfer wealth
across time and between uncertain states of nature.
In a one agent model the agent also performs the role of the producer, and therefore,
adds following variables to his constraints
p(0)  x(0) = p(0)  !(0)   qz + qb   p(0)   k(0)
p(s)  x(s) = p(s)  !(1) + R( y;s)z + p(s)  y(0) ;
where  k(0) denotes the capital purchased. Let aside the modeling of nancing production
for a while, therefore, let  = z +^ b; where ^ b is a feasible nancial policy of the rm such
that ^ b ) Y j^ b : Here, take production set Y j^ b as given. This production set is available to





++  R  R
lS :
p(0)  x(0) = p(0)  !(0)   q   p(0)   k(0)




The agent 's control problem is to choose (x;;y) such that utility of consumption of
goods is maximized. By reduced form, we mean a model where nancial policies are not
explicitly modeled and decisions of the agents not fully separated. We formally introduce
the reduced form model below.
Denition 1 A reduced form equilibrium ( p;  q) with associated equilibrium allocations  
 x;  ;  y





 x;  ;  y

argmaxfu(x) : x 2 Bg
(ii)   = 0
 x(0) = !(0) +  k(0)
 x(s) = !(1) +  y(s) for all s 2 f1;:::;Sg.
(2)
Theorem (1) although derived within a simple economic framework is non-trivial. At
rst sight it seems to reproduce the result of the existing literature on production. This is
commented on in remarks (1), and (2) below. However, remark (3) enables to interpret this
result as not only separating the activities of the agent, but also separating the objective
function of the rm from the utility of the owner of the rm. The result suggests that the
classical GEI model of production is a special case of the model introduced in this paper.
Theorem 1 ( p;  q) is a reduced form equilibrium with associated equilibrium allocations  
 x;  ;  y

for generic initial resources ! 2 
 separating activities of the agent as a consumer




 x;  

argmaxfu(x) : x 2 Bg
(ii) ( y)argmax
  p(s)  y(s) : y 2 B
	
(iii)   = 0
 x(0) = !(0) +  k(0)
 x(s) = !(1) +  y(s) for all s 2 f1;:::;Sg.
(3)
3Remark 1 Note that this separation result is still dependent on the present value vector
of the consumer. Consequently, the objective function of the rm is not decentralized yet,
only the activities of the agent as a consumer and as a producer.
Remark 2 If one is willing to accept that the consumer assigns his own present value
vector to the rm to evaluate future income streams, then this model reproduces the re-
sult from the literature (One can alternatively think of this model as an entrepreneurship
model).
Remark 3 However, if one is willing to think that the single agent is perfectly able to
separate his activity as a consumer and as a producer, then this model allows him as a
producer not to attach the present value of the consumer to the objective function of the
rm, since as a producer, he is not exposed to the no-arbitrage condition. This follows
from the dierent role nancial assets and intermediate goods play.
Remark three becomes even more natural once considering economic scenarios beyond
the single agent model.
2.1 Decentralizing the objective function (by assumption of long
run prot maximization)
Assume that the producer maximizes long run prots. This implies that at t = 0; 
implicitly nances the production set available to a rm in t = 1. Denote the production
set available to the rm Y j^ b and assume that it exists. Short run prot maximization then
implies that the producer chooses inputs of production, given production capacity at xed
nancial policy, such that production of outputs maximizes his prots. The nancing of
production inputs in t = 1 is dened by the sell of production outputs. Long run prot
maximization implies that the xed nancial policy of the rm maximizes prots over
both periods. The reduced form objective of long run maximization of prots is then to
( y)argmax
nXS
s=1  p(s)  y(s) : y(s) 2 Y j^ b (s);8s 2 S
o
: (4)
Proposition 1 ( p;  q) is a reduced form long run prot maximizing equilibrium with decen-
tralized objective function of the rm and with associated equilibrium allocations [
 
 x;  

;( y)]
for generic initial resources ! 2 
, if following conditions are satised:
(i)
 
 x;  

argmaxfu(x) : x 2 Bg
(ii) ( y)argmax
nPS
s=1  p(s)  y(s) : y(s) 2 Y j^ b (s);8s 2 S
o
(iii)   = 0
 x(0) = !(0) +  k(0)
 x(s) = !(1) +  y(s) for all s 2 f1;:::;Sg:
This result follows from remark (3). It shows the independence of the objective func-
tion from the present value vector of the agent as a consumer. The result is a consequence
of the endogenous asset structure of the model, where the rm builds up production ca-
pacity by issuing stocks. This is, although derived in its simplest form, an interesting
result. It generalizes, by means of a simple example, the decentralization property of the
Arrow-Debreu model to the case of incomplete markets.
42.2 Productive eciency of the reduced form model with de-
centralized objective function
The next result shows that the organization of production is generally ecient. This result
improves on the existing literature, where the organization of production is generally
inecient. The result follows from the endogenized asset structure for which we showed
the independence of the objective function from the utility of the stockholders.
Proposition 2 ( p;  q) is a reduced form equilibrium with ecient organization of produc-
tion and decentralized objective function of the rm (long run prots maximization) with
associated equilibrium allocations [( x;  );( y)] for generic initial resources ! 2 
.
The proof of proposition (2) makes use of the fact that the objective function of the
rm is independent of any assigned present value vectors of the consumer to it. The
problem of the rm in the reduced form model is therefore essentially equivalent to the
problem of the rm in the Arrow Debreu model. Hence, the organization of production is
ecient. This result also implicitly states that any utility maximizing model of the rm
in GEI introduces a further source of ineciency.
Remark 4 This model has similar (in)eciency properties of equilibrium as the classical
GEI exchange model. The point here is that at variance with the classical GEI model of
production the organization of production does not introduce a further source of ine-
ciency by attaching some present value  to the objective function of the rm.
Proposition 3 ( p;  q) is a reduced form centralized nancial markets equilibrium with
equilibrium allocations [( x;  );( y)] with inecient organization of production of the rm
for generic initial resources ! 2 
, if and only if
 (s) 6=   ! e for every s 2 f1;:::;Sg (5)
is satised.
The condition  (s) 6=   ! e for every s 2 f1;:::;Sg is generally satised for centralized
general equilibrium models with incomplete markets. This follows from the no-arbitrage
condition.   ! e is a unit vector of appropriate dimension.
Alternatively, consider a two agent model, and assign dierent average present value
vectors to the objective function of the rm. Thus, real equilibrium distortions due to the
dependency of the objective function of an average present value vector.
2.3 The extensive form model
We now introduce the extensive form model, where decisions are fully decentralized and
nancial policies explicitly modeled. Consider the consumer's constraints
p(0)  x(0) = p(0)  !(0)   qz
p(s)  x(s) = p(s)  !(1) + ( z)R( y;s);
where qz is the value the consumer is willing to invest into the rm at expected return
R. As a producer, the agent issues stocks b satisfying qb = qz, buys capital k(0) such that
income from selling stocks is equal to his expenditure on capital consumption, therefore,
qb = p(0)  k(0). At t = 0, the producer's long run problem is to
5  k(0); b)

argmaxf qb :  q z =  qb =  p(0)  k(0)g; (6)
where the level of capital, k(0), implies total production capacity available to the rm, a
correspondence j^ b : This correspondence in turn determines the production set available
to the rm, denoted Y j^ b : Given this production set, and the set of states of nature, the
producer's t = 1 short run problem is to
( y(s))argmaxf p(s)  y(s) : y(s) 2 Y j^ b (s);8s 2 Sg: (7)
Inputs of production are nanced with sells from outputs. The level of revenue a
rm can generate in each state s 2 f1;:::;Sg depends on the available production set
determined in the certain state of the world.
Theorem (2) shows the independence of the objective function from any present value
vector derived from the owners of the rm for the extensive form model. It also also
establishes, through the objective function of the rm, a link between the real and nancial
sector. This result improves on the GEI literature on production which considers the
production and nancial sets to be dichotomic sets.
Theorem 2 ( p;  q) is a decentralized objective function extensive form equilibrium with




) for generic initial resources ! 2 
, if for
any feasible ^ b 6  z following conditions are satised:
(i) ( x;  z)argmaxfu(x) : x 2 Bzg
(ii) argmax




s=1  p(s)  y(s) :
 q z   qb =  p(0)  k(0)
y(s) 2 Y j^ b (s) s 2 S

(iii)  z +^ b = 0 ( z) = 1
 x(0) = !(0) +  k(0)
 x(s) = !(1) +  y(s) for all s 2 f1;::;Sg.
(8)
Next result is a rst step towards a study of the Modigliani and Miller theorem for
the class of endogenous asset formation models. It shows that, as a consequence of the
independency of the production set on the nancial activities of the rm, nancial policies
have real eects. This result follows from the way nancial assets and intermediate goods
enter the model. In particular, the objective function of the rm links the real with
the nancial sphere. In the classical GEI model, rms issue stocks in order to nance
production inputs in period one, here, rms issue stocks in order to buy capital and to
build up their production set. Hence, real eects. Note that this result is established
without considering other nancial assets. The idea of the proof is to improve on the
implicit assumption that nancial policy is independent of the production set of the rm
at rst instance. More work needs to be done in order to proof the full version of the
Modigliani and Miller theorem.
Proposition 4 (i) If (( p;  q);( x;  z);( y;^ b)) is an extensive form equilibrium (EFE) with
decentralized objective function for generic initial resources ! 2 
 then (( p;  q), ( x;  );( y))
is a reduced form equilibrium (RFE) with decentralized objective function for generic initial
resources ! 2 
 where
  =  z +^ b (9)
6(ii) If (( p;  q);( x;  );( y)) is a (RFE) with decentralized objective function for generic initial
resources ! then (( p;  q);( x;  z);( y;^ b)) is a (RFE) with decentralized objective function for
generic initial resources ! 2 
 for any ^ b   z satisfying
 z +^ b =  : (10)
3 Conclusion
This paper considers the leading case of an endogenous asset formation model. In this
model intermediate goods and nancial assets play an essential role in determining the
rms production set. Adding this structure to the economic model has non-trivial impli-
cations for the theory of the rm in incomplete markets. (i) It allows to expand the prot
maximization criterion of the Arrow-Debreu model to a model with incomplete income
transfer space. This is at variance with the literature, where the objective function of the
rm is not independent of the utilities of the stock holders. (ii) As a consequence of the
sequential structure of the objective function of the rm introduced, the organization of
productive activity is ecient. This is welfare improving since the redistribution of en-
dowments is more ecient relative to utility dependent production models. (iii) Since the
ecient boundary of the production set is not independent of the nancial activities of the
rm, it follows that nancial policies are determinate. The failure of the Modigliani and
Miller theorem follows from the improvement on their implicit assumption that the pro-
duction set available to a rm is exogenous. Hence, independent of the nancial activities
of the rm.
Future research shall generalize the results derived in this paper. For example, a more
general version of the Modigliani and Miller theorem should be considered. This involves
including bonds and other nancial assets. Then, it would be natural to consider the
possibility of default. This is research in progress.
A Appendix: Mathematical Proofs
Proof 1 (Theorem 1) Forming the Lagrangean
L = u(x)  (0)





s=1 (s)[ p(s)  x(1)    p(s)  !(s) + R( y;s) +  p(s)  y(s)]
 
PS
s=1 (s)[j^ b ( y(s))]
the rst order conditions are necessary and sucient for (x;;y) to be a solution of equi-
librium denition (1) if there exists  2 R
S+1




 x;  ;  y;  ;  

 0
This is equivalent to







s=1  (s)r jZ ( y(s)) =
XS
s=1
 (s) p(s) (13)
 p   x =  p  ! + ( y;  p)  (14)
j^ b ( y(s) = 0 (15)





; then  q =
PS
s=1  (s)R( y;s) and from (11) and (13) have
XS
s=1
 (s) p(s) = ru( x(s)) =
XS












r jZ ( y(s)) (16)
The rst part of the proof shows that equilibrium denition (1) has a solution, and there-
fore, that (i) of (1) theorem has a solution. It remains to show that part (ii) of theorem
(1) has a solution. Now, if assign  (s) for each s 2 S to the optimization problem of the




 (s) p(s)  y(s) : y(s) 2 Y j^ b
o
: (17)
This problem has a solution if there exists  2 RlS
++ such that
L( y)  0 (18)
This is equivalent to
PS
s=1  (s) p(s) =
PS
s=1  (s)r j^ b ( y(s)) (19)





r j^ b ( y(s)) =
XS
s=1  (s)r j^ b ( y(s)): (20)
Proof 2 (Proposition 1) The result follows from the rst order conditions
XS
s=1











s=1  p(s)  y(s) : y(s) 2 Y j^ b
o
This problem has a solution if there exists  2 RlS
++ such that
L( y)  0
This is equivalent to
PS
s=1  p(s) =
PS
s=1  (s)r j^ b ( y(s)) (21)
Equ. (21) is independent of the present value vector   of the consumer. This decentralizes
the objective function of the rm.
8Proof 3 (Proposition 2) Consider a reduced form incomplete nancial markets equilib-
rium with decentralized prot maximizing objective function ( p;  q) with associated equilib-
rium allocations ( x;  );( y) for an economy ! 2 
: Let (x;y) not be a constraint productive
ecient allocation at price system  p and  q; and period one nancial trade   =  z + ^ b for
implicit feasible ^ b: Then, because (x;y) at   is a feasible competitive nancial markets
equilibrium with production allocation at t = 1, it satises
 x(0) = !(0) +  k(0)
 x(s) = !(1) +  y(s)
  = 0; (22)
Because (x;y) is not ecient optimal, in the sense that period two allocations are not
optimal, given nancial constraint   implying production capacity  k(0) and technology
j^ b ; which in turn implies the constraint production set available to the rm in t = 1,
denoted Y j^ b, there must exist and alternative feasible allocation (^ x; ^ y) within the constraint
production set available to the producer Y j^ b such that
u(^ x(0); ^ x(s);  ) > u(x(0);x(s);  ); for all s 2 f1;::;Sg (23)
We have that
 p(0)  ^ x(0) >  p(0)  x(0)
 p(s)  ^ x(s) >  p(s)  x(s); for all s 2 f1;::;Sg (24)
This implies that
 p(0)  ^ x(0) >  p(0)  x(0)
 p(s)  ^ x(s) >  p(s)  x(s); for all s 2 f1;::;Sg
We then have for feasible (^ x; ^ y) that
 p(0)  !(0) +  p(0)   k(0) >  p(0)  !(0) +  p(0)   k(0)
 p(s)  (^ y(s) + !(1)) >  p(s)  (y(s) + !(1));
for all s 2 f1;::;Sg so that period two long run prots
 p(s)  ^ y(s) >  p(s)  y(s): (25)
However, this implies that  p  ^ y >  p  y ; where ^ y 2 Y j^ b at equilibrium  . This is a
contradiction to the fact that yj 2 Y j^ b is prot maximizing at price system  p and  :
Proof 4 (Proposition 3) To see the inecient organization of production of the rst
model (similar to the literature). Assign present value vector   to the rm, then for




 (s) p(s)  y(s) : y(s) 2 Y j^ b
o
(26)
Then (26) is equal to
( y)argmax
nXS
s=1  p(s)  y(s) : y(s) 2 Y j^ b
o
(27)
9if and only if
 (s) = e for every s 2 S 2 f1;::;Sg (28)
where e is an unit vector. This condition is generally not satised for a no-arbitrage
equilibrium when S > n. For any  (s)
~ 0 <  (s) < e (29)
the centralized model of production is less ecient than the fully decentralized objective
function model since
max
 y j (  p) < max
 y ( p) (30)
y(s)j  6= y(s) 2 Y j^ b :






















s=1  p(s)  y(s) :
 q z   qb =  p(0)  k(0)




for feasible ^ b. This problem has a solution for any feasible ^ b equivalent to the solution in
the (RFE), where there exists  2 RlS
++ such that
L(y)  0
This is equivalent to PS
s=1  p(s) =
PS
s=1  (s)r j^ b ( y(s))
Equ. (31) is independent of the present value (s) of the consumer for any feasible ^ b   z.
This decentralizes the objective function of the rm.
Proof 6 (Proposition 4) Part (i). Let us rst show that (( x;  );( y)) satisfy the rst
order conditions (1)  2 h( y;  p)i;  2 h( y;  p)i
? ; and (2) y 2 Y j^ b ; p 2 NY jZ(y) so that
conditions (i) and (ii) in (RFE) are satised, where  = ( y;  p)z is an income vector.
The FOC's for the consumer's problem in (EFE) are





;and ( y;  p) = 0 (32)
10and can be rewritten as
p  x = p  ! + ( y;  p);and ( y;  p) = 0
since  
 
^ b =  z + ^ b; so that (1) above holds for any feasible ^ b 6  z. The rm's problem in
(EFE)
argmax




s=1  p(s)  y(s) :
 q z   qb =  p(0)  k(0)
y(s) 2 Y j^ b (s) s 2 S





s=1  p(s)  y(s) : y(s) 2 Y j^ b (s);s 2 S
o
since feasible b ) j^ b (s) =) Y j^ b for which the rst order condition (2) which is equivalent
to (s)r j^ b = p(s) above holds. The result follows ,since market clearing condition
 
 
^ b =  z +^ b = 0; and  x(0) = !(0) +  k(0);  x(s) = !(1) +  y(s) for all s 2 f1;::;Sg hold.
Part (ii). If (( x;  );( y)) is an (RFE) for implicit ^ b; then the rst order conditions are













s=1  p(s)  y(s) :
 q z   qb =  p(0)  k(0)
y(s) 2 Y j^ b (s) s 2 S

(34)
for which the rst order conditions are satised, hence  y is a solution of (ii) in (EFE) for
feasible ^ b. Pick any feasible ^ b and dene
z +^ b =   (35)
such that z+^ b =   becomes (z+^ b) =  ; then rst order conditions for the consumer
of the (EFE) (32) is satised for ( x;z). ( x;z) is a solution of (EFE) (i) and ( y;^ b) is a
solution of (EFE) (ii). The result follows from 0 =  = z + ^ b and x (0) = !(0) +  k(0);
 x(s) = !(1) +  y(s) for all s 2 f1;::;Sg:
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